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COMMENT 
A QUALIFIED DEFENSE: 
IN SUPPORT OF THE DOCTRINE 
OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY IN 
EXCESSIVE FORCE CASES, 
WITH SOME SUGGESTIONS 
FOR ITS IMPROVEMENT 
MICHAEL M. ROSEN" 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine the following scenario: a police officer serving an 
arrest warrant surprises the suspect, who promptly leaps into 
his car, guns the engine, and drives off. The officer, on foot and 
with gun drawn, opens fire on the vehicle in an effort to disable 
it and apprehend the suspect. A bullet goes astray and gravely 
injures the suspect. How does - and should - our constitu-
tional tort system address this situation? Does it matter if the 
" Michael M. Rosen is an attorney in San Diego at Fish & Richardson PC, an 
intellectual property law fIrm. In 2003-2004 he served as a law clerk to The Honorable 
Marilyn L. Huff, Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
California. He graduated from Harvard Law School in 2003, and he gratefully ac-
knowledges the guidance of Professor William Stuntz, under whose tutelage he origi-
nally wrote this article while at Harvard. Michael also offers profound thanks to De-
tective Jesse H. Grant of the Oakland Police Department for his time and enthusiasm 
in explaining the ins-and-outs of police work in a challenging city. Michael also thanks 
his family for their continued love and support. He dedicates this article to his wife, 
Debra, for her inexhaustible patience and constant inspiration. 
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event occurred in a high-crime area? If the suspect was aiming 
his car at the police officer? If it was broad daylight on a street 
filled with children at play? If the officer's police department 
had issued guidelines for using deadly force in these instances? 
If the department or the law enforcement union paid its offi-
cers' legal fees? 
All of these questions come into play when the complex 
doctrine of qualified immunity encounters the rough-and-
tumble world of excessive force tort lawsuits. 1 Our system 
strikes a balance between supporting the efforts of law en-
forcement agents and redressing the wrongs that they visit on 
ordinary citizens, through the vehicle of qualified immunity! 
In an atmosphere in which police officers face a growing move-
ment of "depolicing,"3 qualified immunity remains a bulwark 
against the costs and over-deterrence that tort trials impose! 
Under the standard for qualified immunity, which courts gen-
erally apply at the summary judgment" stage of the litigation, a 
defendant who can show either that no clearly established law 
barred his or her conduct or that the behavior itself implicated 
no constitutional concerns will avoid trial and the discovery 
process.6 
Critics argue with some force, however, that qualified im-
munity in the Fourth Amendment excessive force context is an 
incoherent jumble of legal standards and policy premises that 
bear no relationship to reality.' This article addresses several 
criticisms of the qualified immunity doctrine and defends the 
doctrine, through an examination of the key cases and com-
mentary on them, as a reasonably coherent and effective 
mechanism for sorting out worthy from unworthy litigation.s 
1 "Qualified immunity" can briefly be defined as a protection from trial available 
to certain government employees acting in their official capacity if the conduct in ques-
tion did not violate a constitutional right clearly established at the time of the incident. 
2 See infra Part I-B. 
3 "Depolicing" refers to a decline in support of the efforts of law enforcement 
from municipal authorities, usually as a reflection of worsening popular perception of a 
local police department. 
4 See infra Parts I-A and I-B. 
• A summary judgment hearing is held prior to trial when a party believes that 
no genuine issues of material fact exist and that the moving party is entitled to judg-
ment as a matter oflaw. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
6 See infra Part I-B. 
, See infra Part II. 
B [d. 
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This article also identifies some important shortcomings in the 
doctrine and outlines modifications that would improve its 
functioning, improvements that would quiet the chorus of criti-
cism that several commentators have directed at the doctrine.9 
Part I provides background information concerning the 
doctrine of qualified immunity and its application to excessive 
force cases. Part I also considers the policy debates that the 
doctrine has bred, concluding that on balance qualified immu-
nity serves two important functions that give the doctrine pur-
pose. Part II defends the doctrine in excessive force cases 
against three criticisms: that conduct cannot be "reasonably 
unreasonable,""o that summary judgment is ill-matched to the 
factual and legal questions posed by qualified immunity argu-
ments,l1 and that the term "clearly established" is anything 
but.12 Part II also responds to the criticisms hurled at the 
qualified immunity doctrine, demonstrating that conduct can 
be "reasonably unreasonable," arguing that through limited 
discovery qualified immunity would become better suited for 
summary judgment, and suggesting standards for defining 
"clearly established law." Part III concludes the article and 
recapitulates its major points. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. THE DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 
Simply put, if an officer's conduct, viewed in the light most 
favorable to an excessive force plaintiff, did not violate a clearly 
established constitutional right at the time of the incident, the 
defendant can avoid standing trial for the alleged tort. The 
contemporary standardl3 for qualified immunity is most clearly 
articulated in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, I. Anderson v. Creighton, 15 
• Id. 
10 See infra Part II-A. 
11 See infra Part II-B. 
12 See infra Part II-C. 
13 See, e.g., Barbara Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 Vand. 
L. Rev. 583 (1998) and Alan Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary 
Judgment and the Role of Facts in Constitutional Tort Law, 47 Am. U. L. Rev. 1 (1997) 
for excellent historical descriptions of the development of the doctrine. 
14 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
15 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987). 
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and Saucier v. Katz. 16 In Harlow, the Supreme Court first ar-
ticulated the modern view of qualified immunity.17 There, the 
plaintiff sued the President of the United States and several of 
his senior advisors for conspiring unlawfully to discharge him 
from the Air Force. IB Defendant Harlow argued that he had 
acted in good faith and had had no reason to believe a conspir-
acy existed.19 Asserting that the social costs of frivolous litiga-
tion include "the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official 
energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able 
citizens from acceptance of public office," Justice Powell found 
for the majority that the defendants could assert qualified, but 
not absolute, immunity:o The Court held that this immunity 
shields government agents from liability for civil damages so 
long as their conduct does not violate "clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 
would have known.1I21 
In Anderson, the Court refined Harlow's statement of the 
doctrine by defming "clearly established law" and by holding 
that the Fourth Amendment itself represented far too broad a 
standard to constitute clearly established law." The court 
found that if something as general as a constitutional amend-
ment qualified as clearly established law, then officers in the 
field would lack guidance entirely."3 Instead of the "extremely 
abstract rights" that Creighton claimed Anderson violated, in 
order to escape a defendant's motion for summary judgment, a 
plaintiff would need to show that "the contours of the right 
[are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would under-
stand that what he is doing violates that right .... • The phrase 
16 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). 
17 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 802. 
16 Id. at 802-3. 
19 Id. at 804. 
'" Id. at 814-15. 
21 Id. at 818. In a footnote, the Harlow court made an important observation, 
distinguishing in theory but equating in practice constitutional violations brought 
against state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and "suits brought directly under the 
Constitution against federal officials." Id. at 818 n.30. These latter suits, known as 
Bivens actions after a prototypical case, will remain indistinguishable from § 1983 
litigation for the purposes of this article. 
22 Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639. 
23 Id. As Justice Scalia argued for the majority, "if the test of 'clearly established 
law' were to be applied at this level of generality, it would bear no relationship to the 
'objective legal reasonableness' that is the touchstone of Harlow." Id . 
.. Id. at 640. 
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"clear contours" has become the touchstone for many qualified 
immunity scholars who have searched for a definition of 
"clearly established" law:5 
In Saucier, the Court held that qualified immunity applied 
to excessive force cases. A military policeman shoved Katz -
the plaintiff - into a van in the wake of Katz's protest of Vice 
President AI Gore's speech at a decommissioned army base in 
San Francisco:6 Elliot Katz unfurled a banner as Gore began 
speaking, an action that Donald Saucier and other agents 
viewed as threatening to the Vice President.27 After the district 
court denied Saucier summary judgment, the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed, finding that the defendant's actions, as alleged by the 
plaintiff, were "objectively unreasonable. rna More importantly, 
the court of appeals asserted, "the inquiry as to whether offi-
cers are entitled to qualified immunity for the use of excessive 
force is the same as the inquiry on the merits of the excessive 
force claim. "29 
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Ninth Cir-
cuit had misstated the standard for qualified immunity.30 Jus-
tice Kennedy, writing for the Court, began by describing the 
nature of qualified immunity as "'an immunity from suit rather 
than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, 
it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to 
trial.'"31 The Court then observed that the Ninth Circuit had 
reversed the proper order of the immunity calculus; instead, a 
court must first examine whether a constitutional right would 
have been violated based on the plaintiffs allegations.32 If so, 
the court must then explore whether the plaintiffs alleged 
right was clearly established at the time of the incident.33 Re-
ferring to the "clear contours" language in Anderson, Justice 
Kennedy asserted that the inquiry hinges on "whether it would 
.. See infra Part II-C; see also Karen M. Blum, Qualified Immunity: A User's 
Manual, 26 Ind. L. Rev. 187,202 (1993). 
26 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 197-99. 
27 Id. at 198. 
28 Katz v. U.S., 194 F.3d 962, 970 (9th Cir. 2000). 
28 Id. at 968. (quoting, among others, Alexander v. County of Los Angeles, 64 
F.3d 1315, 1322 (9th Cir. 1995». This issue will be taken up in Part II-A. 
30 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). 
31Id. at 200-1 (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (emphasis in 
original)) . 
32 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 20l. 
33 Id. 
5
Rosen: Improving Qualified Immunity
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2005
144 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35 
be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in 
the situation he confronted."34 Such unlawfulness can be de-
duced not only from directly relevant statutes but also from 
analogous case law.35 In the instance at hand, the plaintiff, 
Katz, failed to demonstrate that clearly established law prohib-
ited the defendant's conduct.36 
The Court went further in an effort to preempt the criti-
cisms of the concurrence that its formulation enabled "reasona-
bly unreasonable conduct." Justice Kennedy explained the 
"further dimension" that qualified immunity adds to the stan-
dard reasonableness calculus: 
The concern of the immunity inquiry is to acknowledge that 
reasonable mistakes can be made as to the legal constraints 
on particular police conduct. It is sometimes difficult for an 
officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here ex-
cessive force, will apply to the factual situation the officer con-
fronts. An officer might correctly perceive all of the relevant 
facts but have a mistaken understanding as to whether a par-
ticular amount of force is legal in those circumstances. If the 
officer's mistake as to what the law requires is reasonable, 
however, the officer is entitled to the immunity defense.37 
In other words, for the officer to lose the benefit of qualified 
immunity, not only must the conduct be unreasonable but the 
officer's application of the most relevant legal standard to the 
situation at hand must also lack a reasonable basis. 
Writing in concurrence, Justice Ginsburg, along with Jus-
tices Stevens and Breyer, sought to consolidate, as the Ninth 
Circuit did, the qualified immunity inquiry into the simple 
question of "whether officer Saucier, in light of the facts and 
circumstances confronting him, could have reasonably believed 
he acted lawfully.»38 Under this approach, the two-part test rec-
ommended by Anderson would not constitute an appropriate 
model for excessive force cases, an area of the law that is un-
dergoing continuous change.39 But the majority's test is the 
.. [d. at 202. 
M [d. See infra Part II-C. 
36 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 209. 
37 [d. at 205. 
38 [d. at 211. 
39 [d. at 214. 
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regnant standard for qualified immunity, even in excessive 
force cases. An examination of how well this doctrine relates to 
the delicate real-world interactions between police officers and 
the civilians they serve occupies the next section. 
B. POLICY ANALYSIS 
Public policy seeks to balance the need to protect law en-
forcement officers from frivolous lawsuits against the desire to 
support citizens in serious ones. l This section addresses various 
data and policy arguments presented by police unions and oth-
ers in favor of early dismissal of unworthy cases. Most impor-
tantly, these arguments revolve around costs and deterrence. 
Groups like the National Association of Police Organizations 
("NAPO") argue that litigation against law enforcement has 
proliferated over the years and that officers and/or their em-
ployers are forced to spend increasing amounts of money de-
fending against frivolous suits.'o They also argue that the spec-
ter of a trial negatively affects officers' behavior on the job in a 
serious way." The trend of "depolicing" or of civilian municipal 
leadership failing to support the efforts of law enforcement has 
exacerbated the situation, as was evident from an interview I 
conducted with Detective Jesse H. Grant, an Oakland, Califor-
nia, police officer. ,. 
Critics contend, however, that the policy arguments, if 
anything, tilt in favor of abolishing qualified immunity. Alan 
Chen," Barbara Armacost," and others argue that because 
agents are indemnified by the government, they have little rea-
son to fear litigation, or at least to allow that fear to impact 
their job performance. In addition, some argue that the courts 
have moved away from relying on deterrence and have focused 
strictly on costs.'· They contend that qualified immunity im-
40 See Brief of Amicus Curiae National Association of Police Organizations and 
National Law Enforcement Officers' Rights Center, in Support of the Petitioner at 2, 
Saucier u. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (No. 99-1977) (hereinafter NAPOAmicus). 
41 [d. 
.2 Interview with Jesse H. Grant, Detective, Oakland Police Department's Spe-
cial Victims Unit, in Somerville, Massachusetts (Jan. 14-16, 2003). Detective Grant 
works as a patrolman and an investigator in the Oakland (Calif.) Police Department's 
Special Victims Unit. He graciously provided his time and insights for this article. 
43 Chen, supra note 13 . 
.. Armacost, supra note 13. 
'" [d. 
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poses more costs, by creating uncertainty and the potential for 
interlocutory appeals, than it saves, by terminating lawsuits at 
an early stage:6 Upon careful examination of these various 
claims, it becomes clear that some form of qualified immunity 
is warranted by the policy arguments. 
1. Reducing Costs and Deterring Crime Through Qualified 
Immunity 
It is hard to deny that the more time police officers spend 
at trial defending their conduct, the less time they spend pa-
trolling the streets, the more money their departments expend 
in their defense, and the more frequently the officers will sec-
ond-guess certain behaviors in the heat of the moment. These 
drawbacks may well be justified for the sake of society's pre-
vention of tortious and unreasonable conduct on the part of law 
enforcement agents. Nevertheless, police agencies, Supreme 
Court justices, and some scholars highlight the important role 
that qualified immunity can play in reducing unnecessary costs 
and in improving deterrence of crime. 
In its amicus brief in support of the Saucier petitioner, 
NAPO addressed several concerns related to costs and deter-
rence.47 It began by asserting that officers currently face too 
many lawsuits related to their conduct, litigation that gener-
ally is resolved in their favor and therefore wastes taxpayer 
time and money!S It pointed to an "ever increasing number of 
lawsuits against law enforcement officers" and the threat that 
increase poses to the general public interest.49 The increased 
threat of lawsuits, according to this argument, deters effective 
police performance, thereby diminishing public safety:o NAPO 
referred to Justice Scalia's assertion in Anderson v. Creighton5l 
that permitting frivolous lawsuits against law enforcement to 
go to trial "entaiHs] substantial social costs, including the risk 
46 [d. 
47 See generally NAPO Amicus, supra note 40. 
46 [d. at 2. 
49/d. 
50 [d, at 7-8. NAPO claimed that the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Saucier "places 
officers at risk of undue interference in the performance of their duties" and "directly 
impacts public safety, as officers become reluctant to use any force while restraining, 
arresting, or frisking an individual, for fear of being sued for any force that they use." 
[d. . 
61 483 U.S. 635 (1987). 
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that fear of personal monetary liability and harassing litiga-
tion will unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their du-
ties."·2 
Several scholars echo NAPO's concerns. Richard Fallon 
and Daniel Meltzer describe the fears of the Supreme Court in 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald,53 explaining that such litigation works its 
evils by deterring officers through the threat of personal liabil-
ity. Barbara Armacost notes that such liability begets poor law 
enforcement, which in turn harms the very people the officers 
are sworn to protect. 54 The chief of the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation Academy's Legal Instruction Unit echoes these sen-
timents.55 Thus, at least in theory, the proliferation oflawsuits 
appears to involve serious risks5s to agents as well as the public. 
Of course, this entire edifice hangs on the assumption that 
law enforcement agents regularly face personal liability for 
their conduct when acting under color of law. Fallon and Melt-
zer challenge this premise. 57 They contend that in most situa-
tions, the police department and/or the officers' union make use 
of a legal defense fund while the officer need not expend a 
62 Id. at 638. In poetic language, another court found that the danger of being 
sued might "dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible 
[public officialsl, in the unflinching discharge of their duties." Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 
F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950) .. 
63 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. and 
Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non·Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 
Harv. L. Rev. 1731, 1821 (1991). 
54 Armacost, supra note 13, at 586. Armacost observes that the system's "unbal-
anced incentive structure may drive officials toward inaction, underenforcement, delay 
and other defensive tactics that limit their personal costs but disadvantage the public." 
Id. See also Peter H. Schuck, Suing Government 68-77 (1983). 
56 Daniel L. Schofield, Personal Liability - the Qualified Immunity Defense, FBI 
Law Enforcement Bulletin, (March 1990) (no page numbers provided), quoted in NAPO 
Amicus, supra note 40, at 11. The FBI Academy's Legal Instruction chief asserts that 
"the fear of personal liability can seriously erode this necessary confidence and willing-
ness to act. Even worse, law enforcement officers who have an unrealistic or exagger-
ated fear of personal liability may become overly timid or indecisive and fail to arrest 
or search to the detriment of the public's interest in effective and aggressive law en-
forcement." Id. 
66 NAPO also argues that the increase in lawsuits hampers recruiting efforts. In 
its words, "It is no wonder that police departments are having difficulty recruiting 
officers, with poor morale being the biggest obstacle to retaining current officers and a 
major factor in recruiting new ones." NAPO Amicus, supra note 40, at 3. Fallon and 
Meltzer echo this sentiment, noting that the Harlow court feared that a proliferation of 
litigation "harmed the public interest by deterring able persons from entering public 
service." Fallon and Meltzer, supra note 53, at 182l. 
67 Fallon and Meltzer, supra note 53, at 1822. 
9
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penny of his or her own.58 Thus, Fallon and Meltzer contend 
that the entire policy argument rests on a false assumption. 
Nonetheless, despite the unlikelihood of an officer facing 
personal liability, frivolous litigation imposes serious secondary 
costs on his or her conduct. First, contributions or premiums 
paid to a legal defense insurance plan will likely increase with 
the amount of litigation the officer faces. Second, the officer's 
career may endure a stain or stigma despite a victory on the 
merits of an excessive force case. Third, the department, as the 
officer's employer, may impose discipline, whether formal or 
informal, on any officer's involvement in litigation, whether 
successful or unsuccessful. Suspensions or unpaid leave may 
accompany lawsuits faced even by officers who are ultimately 
victorious in court. Thus, litigation indeed affects officers' con-
duct, in the heat of the moment, whether reasonably or not.59 
This effect dovetails with a growing tendency toward "de-
policing" that has become prevalent in several of America's ur-
ban cores.60 According to many officers, recent years have seen 
an increase in lawsuits and informal complaints brought 
against law enforcement, a correlate tendency in departments 
to steer officers away from necessarily risky conduct in do-or-
die situations, and a concomitant decline in officer morale.61 In 
58 Id. Fallon and Meltzer state that "the notion that constitutional violations are 
the private wrongs of individual defendants has always been substantially fictitious." 
Id. Armacost agrees with these sentiments, arguing that: 
the instrumental rationale has largely ignored or underestimated the impact of 
indemnification. If governmental officials do not bear the financial effects of indi-
vidual liability then, as compared to their private counterparts, they may simply 
have less to gain or lose. In other words, given indemnification and absent some 
systemic bias, incentives might be balanced such that officials will, in fact, con-
sider all the societal costs and benefits of their actions. If so, governmental liabil-
ity would present little or no risk of overdeterrence, making qualified immunity 
unnecessary. 
Armacost, supra note 13, at 586-87. 
59 Justice Scalia in a footnote in Anderson provides another justification by chal-
lenging the argument that "conscientious officials care only about their personal liabil-
ity and not the liability of the government they serve." Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641 n.3. 
In other words, law enforcement officers may also have good reason to fear stigma and 
fmancial penalties attaching to their employer. In the Anderson context itself, Justice 
Scalia went on to find that the plaintiffs did not and could not "reasonably contend that 
the programs to which they refer make reimbursements [to defendants) sufficiently 
certain and generally available to justify" upsetting the balance of costs the Court has 
traditionally relied on. Id. 
60 Interview with Jesse H. Grant, supra note 42. 
61Id. 
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1981 in the State of California,"2 residents placed 8,686 com-
plaints against peace officers, of which 1,552 or 18% were ulti-
mately sustained.63 In 2000, Californians recorded 23,395 com-
plaints, of which 2,395 or 10% were sustained.64 This balloon-
ing of claims - in particular unsuccessful ones65 - is as trou-
bling as it is dramatic. The Oakland, California, Citizens Po-
lice Review Board ("CPRB") embodies this deterrent effect.66 
This board provides an independent forum in which aggrieved 
citizens can register their complaints about police conduct.67 At 
the same time, Detective Jesse H. Grant, who has had personal 
experience appearing before the CPRB, notes that complaints, 
more than 80% of which were not sustained in 2002, impose a 
serious deterrent effect on police conduct. 68 Officers now more 
than ever think twice and act conservatively - although not 
necessarily safely - when engaged in violent altercations with 
or apprehensions of dangerous suspects.69 
Ironically, the presence of entities like the CPRB under-
mines the justification for excessive force lawsuits to begin 
with: by providing an avenue for voicing grievances over police 
conduct, such boards obviate some of the need for civil actions. 
Moreover, they reflect the deterrent effect that wide-open pub-
lic access to disciplinary bodies can breed. Thus, there exist 
significant reasons for the courts to grant some kind of immu-
nity to law enforcement officials in order to ensure the contin-
62 While nationwide statistics mayor may not support the California data, the 
various state attorneys general share the concern of law enforcement across the coun-
try. In their amicus brief to Saucier, twenty-seven attorneys general argued that the 
case "directly impacts state law enforcement." Brief of The States of Texas, Alabama, 
Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Louisiana, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Utah, Vermont, and Washington as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 2, Saucier 
v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (No. 99-1977) (hereinafter Attorneys General Amicus). 
63 California State Attorney General's Office, Crime and Delinquency Annual 
Report, Table 56 available at 
http://caag.state.ca.us/cjsc/publications/canddlcdOO/odb.pdf 
54 /d. 
65 Based on the same statistics, unsustained claims increased threefold between 
1981 and 2000. [d. 
66 Interview with Jesse H. Grant, supra note 42. See also generally City of Oak-
land Citizens' Police Review Board, 2001 Annual Report (hereinafter CPRB Annual 
Report). 
67 CPRB Annual Report, supra note 66, at l. 
68 [d. See also City of Oakland Citizens' Police Review Board, 2002 Annual Re-
port, at 5 (hereinafter CPRB 2002 Annual Report). 
69 Interview with Jesse H. Grant, supra note 42. 
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ued quality of their work. By increasing the threat of litiga-
tion, frivolous lawsuits can serve to deter officers' reasonable 
conduct, thus imperiling public safety and upending the deli-
cate balance society seeks between forcefully fighting crime 
and respectfully treating all citizens. 
2. Counterarguments: Costs, Not Deterrence 
Despite the theoretical existence of the costs described 
above, many critics of the qualified immunity regime object 
that the concerns are misplaced. These commentators contend 
that Supreme Court jurisprudence on qualified immunity has 
focused unnecessarily on costs to law enforcement and the judi-
cial system and not enough on deterrence. Furthermore, this 
line of reasoning goes, the justices have calculated the cost 
equation improperly: the present qualified immunity standard 
imposes undue costs on excessive force plaintiffs. The following 
discussion presents and responds to these arguments. 
Alan Chen argues, first, that such plaintiffs encounter a 
system concerned more with costs than with actual deter-
rence. 70 He asserts that in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,71 the Court 
became more concerned with the litigation burdens placed on 
the court system than with the financial burdens imposed on 
offending officers. 72 Yet, this criticism fails to recognize the re-
lationship between costs and deterrence as a continuum: pres-
sure on one end of the spectrum will ultimately diffuse across 
the continuum to the other end. Increasing the costs to the 
system, whether directly through personal liability or indi-
rectly through liability imposed on departments or legal funds, 
will inevitably, if less immediately, affect the conduct of law 
enforcement agents. 73 
Chen also engages the second argument by pointing to the 
"secondary burdens" - the "social costs specifically generated 
by the litigation of the qualified immunity defense" - faced by 
excessive force plaintiffs. 7' The party contending that the offi-
70 See generally Chen, supra note 13. 
7l 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
72 Chen, supra note 13, at 22. 
73 In addition, costs to these funds impose burdens on police unions or on the 
departments themselves. Such costs directly affect those institutions and indirectly 
impact local and state budgets. 
7. Chen, supra note 13, at 99. 
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cer abused his or her civil rights, according to Chen, must es-
sentially try the case twice: at the pretrial qualified immunity 
hearing and then, if successful, at trial.7~ Without a qualified 
immunity option, the plaintiff, as well as the defendant, could 
save money by proceeding directly to trial. 76 Chen notes that 
when a defendant seeks interlocutory relief the costs multiply 
further; since qualified immunity decisions may under some 
circumstances be appealed before the beginning of trial, such 
appeals may consume large amounts of time and money and, as 
such, impose great burdens on all parties. 77 These concerns 
lead others to denounce qualified immunity as inefficient. 78 
These potential costs raise the possibility that qualified 
immunity may not actually save time and money.79 Yet, it can-
not be forgotten that by short-circuiting unsuccessful lawsuits, 
the qualified immunity doctrine conserves time, money, and 
judicial resources. Coupled with the very real benefits it can 
provide police officers, these savings, however slight, render 
qualified immunity an important mechanism for preserving the 
balance between effective law enforcement and justice for con-
stitutional tort victims. Having responded to the cost criti-
cisms of the qualified immunity doctrine, this article now turns 
to the problems that critics have found lurking within the doc-
trine. The following Part takes up three important criticisms, 
offers rebuttals, and presents suggestions for improving quali-
fied immunity. 
II. A QUALIFIED DEFENSE: CRITIQUES OF THE DOCTRINE, 
RESPONSES, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 
Given that public policy arguments favor the application of 
qualified immunity in excessive force cases, what problems 
lurk within the doctrine, and how can they best be addressed? 
75 [d. at 99-100. 
76 [d. 
77 [d. at 10l. 
78 Blum, supra note 25, at 189. Blum concludes that "the costs of the defense 
may outweigh the benefits to such a degree that the defense should be abandoned as an 
inefficient allocation of resources." [d. 
79 Chen, supra note 13, at 102. Chen writes that "presently, there is no empirical 
foundation for the advocates of the present qualified immunity doctrine or its critics." 
[d. Such an empirical exploration would no doubt cast light on these issues, although 
it may prove difficult for critics and advocates of the doctrine to locate and evaluate the 
data in the same way. 
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First, many critics, including dissenting supreme court justices, 
believe that qualified immunity ineluctably and irrationally 
means finding that an officer "reasonably acted unreasonably," 
since his or her actions may have been unreasonable as a mat-
ter of fact although he or she reasonably erred in legal inter-
pretation.80 According to these critics, the qualified immunity 
calculus is far too complex and should be reduced, instead, to 
an examination of the merits of the case.81 Yet, the "surface 
appeal" of this argument, in Justice Scalia's felicitous phrase, 
is merely semantic.82 Under armacost's eloquent comparison of 
fault and notice, as a matter of fairness, it is possible to rea-
sonably act unreasonably.83 This fairness is related to the ques-
tion of exactly what qualified immunity immunizes against; the 
doctrine, by seeking to dispose of cases at summary judgment, 
constitutes for the most part immunity from trial. 
Second, others, primarily Chen, believe that the unique 
nature of the factual and legal inquiry of qualified immunity 
jurisprudence renders it ill-suited for summary judgment dis-
position.84 As a combination of law and fact, this argument con-
tends that qualified immunity inherently demands findings of 
fact. These factual issues, however, can be set aside or taken 
in the plaintiff's favor, in almost every case, leaving the judge 
well-positioned to find "reasonableness" as a matter of law.55 
Nevertheless, this critique presents a different factual problem 
that cannot be swept aside as easily. Because the factual first 
prong is often so critical, plaintiffs may simply allege suffi-
ciently egregious facts in order to clear the summary judgment 
hurdle, thereby rendering the qualified immunity doctrine al-
most useless. In such cases, a limited discovery process de-
signed to address only the immunity fmding would solve many 
problems. 
Third, and perhaps more importantly, this Part explores 
how the entire qualified immunity doctrine turns critically on 
the meaning of "clearly established. "86 Depending on the thor-
oughness and specificity of the requirement, courts mayor may 
80 See infra Part II-A. 
8I [d. 
82 Anderson, 483 U.S. at 643. 
83 Armacost, supra note 13, at 620. 
54 See infra Part II-B . 
.. Karen Blum argues similarly. See Blum, supra note 25, at 208, 225. 
86 See infra Part II-C. 
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not find a law to be clearly established. Building on the work 
of several scholars, interpreting the relevant case law, and con-
sidering police departmental guidelines reveals a reasonable 
and useful definition of clear establishment and can help dispel 
confusion and inconsistencies. First, it is critical to examine 
the issue of "double reasonableness." 
A. How CONDUCT CAN BE "REASONABLY UNREASONABLE" 
The first major criticism leveled against the qualified im-
munity doctrine relates to the idea of double-counting reason-
ableness. According to this argument, the doctrine permits a 
law enforcement agent to act unreasonably as a matter of fact, 
under a Fourth Amendment or other standard, but to do so 
reasonably as a matter oflaw. This "reasonably unreasonable" 
conduct, according to critics, offends not only an appropriate 
sense of justice and balance in the system but also basic logic. 
Yet, despite what Justice Scalia in Anderson calls the "surface 
appeal" of this argument,s7 it poses only a minor, semantic ob-
stacle to a proper and just understanding of the doctrine. 
Justice Stevens, dissenting in Anderson, appears to have 
been among the first to provide this critique.ss In his language, 
the Court appeared to "approve a double standard of reason-
ableness - the constitutional standard already embodied in the 
Fourth Amendment and an even more generous standard that 
protects any officer who reasonably could have believed that 
his conduct was constitutionally reasonable."s9 According to the 
dissent, this double-insulation of the officer from liability com-
ports neither with justice nor with fundamentallogic. 90 Justice 
Stevens, who earlier contended "an official search and seizure 
cannot be both 'unreasonable' and 'reasonable' at the same 
time,""' argued in Anderson that the Court counted "the law 
enforcement interest twice and the individual's privacy interest 
only once. »92 Thus, he stated, there exist reasons of basic fair-
87 Anderson, 483 U.S. at 643 . 
.. Id. at 648. 
89 [d. 
00 Id. 
9' U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 960 (1984). 
82 Anderson, 483 U.S. at 664. 
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ness and linguistic integrity to reject the majority's articulation 
of the qualified immunity doctrine.93 
Yet, despite the pedigree of this argument,9. it fails to pass 
muster as a genuine objection. Justice Scalia, writing for the 
majority in Anderson, noted that the seeming illogic of "double-
reasonableness" in the Fourth Amendment context - which 
through its "unreasonable seizure" language governs excessive 
force cases - results from the collision of a fortuity with a two-
part test.9• To be sure, the qualified immunity doctrine involves 
factual and legal determinations, one directed to the conduct 
itself and the other to the application of relevant law to the 
facts. While this second determination, according to the Court, 
always involves a finding of reasonableness, the standard for 
the first, factual finding depends on the relevant conduct. In 
the Fourth Amendment context, since the Constitution bars 
"unreasonable" searches and seizures, the factual standard, 
like the legal one, is one of reasonableness. In Justice Scalia's 
words, "had an equally serviceable term, such as 'undue' 
searches and seizures been employed, what might be termed 
the 'reasonably unreasonable' argument ... would not be avail-
able."S6 The linguistic misfortune of the double-reasonableness 
standard derives more from happenstance than from an inher-
ent illogic. Put differently, in the context of tort law, the fac-
tual reasonability - if such is the relevant standard - applies to 
the breach portion of the analysis while the legal reasonability 
pertains to the duty."7 
In the particular context of excessive force cases, the need 
for both legal and factual insulation from liability becomes 
clear. Technically, the "unreasonable ... seizure"S8 involved in 
an excessive force case is the force itself: it is constitutionally 
93 [d. 
o. Alan Chen provides a similar objection. Chen, supra note 13, at 50-52. 
96 Anderson, 483 U.S. at 643. 
96 [d. at 643. 
rTI In its Saucier brief, NAPO offered a similar argument. The Association ar-
gued, quite simply, that "a police officer's conduct may be unreasonable within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment but nevertheless objectively reasonable for quali-
fied immunity purposes." NAPO Amicus, supra note 40, at 17. Likewise, the state 
attorneys general, in equating Fourth Amendment search cases to seizure incidents, 
asserted that "reasonable mistakes that cause unreasonable searches are analytically 
indistinguishable from reasonable mistakes that cause unreasonable uses of force." 
Attorneys General Amicus, supra note 62, at 11 . 
.. U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
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unreasonable to seize control of a suspect's body with greater 
force than is necessary.99 Thus, the Constitution enjoins a po-
lice officer to employ only reasonable force in subduing an indi-
viduaL Yet, this objective legal standard provides the officer 
precious little guidance absent the further clarification re-
quired by the "clear establishment"100 element of the qualified 
immunity calculus - for instance, a rule that an officer may not 
use deadly force against a fleeing suspect unless the suspect 
poses a mortal or highly dangerous risk to others. The officer 
must then apply the relevant guidelines - in which constitu-
tional reasonableness is embedded - to the facts at hand, an 
application that he or she can make either reasonably or un-
reasonably. 
Put differently, there exist three main possibilities when a 
court is considering a defendant's conduct at a qualified immu-
nity summary judgment hearing, two of which will end the liti-
gation in the officer's favor and one of which will compel pro-
ceeding to trial and full-fledged discovery.101 The first possibil-
ity is that, under the plaintiffs version of the facts, the officer's 
actions comported with the factual requirements of the given 
conduct, such as a "reasonable search" of a suspect's home. In 
such an instance, the case would end since the defendant has 
established, on Saucier's first prong, that his or her behavior 
implicated no constitutional concerns. The second possibility is 
that, again under the plaintiffs version of the facts, the officer's 
conduct might have violated the rules governing those actions 
as a matter of fact. But at the same time, the law in that par-
ticular area might not have been clearly established, thus ren-
dering reasonable his or her otherwise problematic application 
of law to fact. This situation, of "reasonable misconduct" -
whether the standard for the misconduct itself is reasonable-
ness, undueness, gross negligence, etc. - would also result in 
early termination of the litigation since the officer would pre-
vail on the second prong of Saucier. The third possibility is 
that the officer's conduct might, under the plaintiffs version of 
the facts, be factually problematic with clearly established law 
99 See u.s. v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 51 (1993). 
100 See infra Part 11- C. 
101 Interview with William Stuntz, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, in 
Cambridge, Mass. (Jan. 7, 2003). William Stuntz developed this approach, upon which 
the author expands. 
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demonstrating, without question, its wrongfulness. In such a 
situation, if the defendant officer's version of the facts would 
put the case within the first possibility (i.e., no factual miscon-
duct), a genuine issue of fact would exist and a trial would be 
necessary to resolve the conflict between the plaintiffs and de-
fendant's versions of what happened. 
Other scholars echo this view of the relevance of fairness to 
the legal prong of the qualified immunity test by noting that it 
would be unreasonable to expect police officers to make heat-of-
the-moment decisions in the excessive force context that some-
how take into account the niceties oflegal balancing tests. '02 In 
Armacost's understanding, "limiting constitutional damages 
liability to cases involving truly blameworthy conduct may best 
preserve the moral force of such liability.",oa An officer, in other 
words, should not be faulted for an inability to apply law that is 
not clearly established to the specifics of the altercation in 
which he or she is involved.'O< Thus, the "reasonably unreason-
able" challenge, while helping to elucidate the complex doctrine 
of qualified immunity, fails to invalidate it. While it may ap-
pear superficially that conduct cannot simultaneously be rea-
sonable and unreasonable, in fact it can. 
B. MIXTURE OF FACT AND LAw 
1. Summary Judgment, According To Critics, Is An Inappro-
priate Stage At Which To Consider Qualified Immunity 
Despite the doctrine's escape from the double-
reasonableness objection, it is precisely its dual requirements 
of factual and legal findings that leave it susceptible to the ob-
jection that pretrial summary judgment is inappropriate. Alan 
Chen, among others, observes that the mixture of fact and law 
required in a qualified immunity determination renders it seri-
ously unfit for disposition at summary judgment.105 In the ex-
102 Armacost, supra note 13, at 661. Armacost asserts that this second stage of 
clear establishment is necessary "because governmental officials are not blameworthy 
if their only error was in failing to predict how the courts would view the balance of 
interests that dermes a constitutional use of force." [d. 
loa [d. at 680. 
104 [d. 
105 See generally Chen, supra note 13. 
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cessive force context in particular, in which factual disputes 
and permutations abound, one might question whether a jury 
ought to determine whether the officer can invoke immunity. 
On the other hand, as Justice Kennedy observed in Saucier, 
once the case is allowed to go to trial, the defendant officer ef-
fectively loses his or her immunity.,oa Factual objections not-
withstanding, a judge in an excessive force case, as in any 
summary judgment hearing, ordinarily can consider undis-
puted facts and interpret disputed ones in the plaintiff's favor 
for the sake of assessing the legal issues involved. '07 
To begin with, one wonders whether the judges involved in 
the Saucier case engaged in fact-finding or simply interpreted 
factual questions appropriately. It appears striking that Judge 
Thompson of the Ninth Circuit read the facts differently from 
Justice Kennedy and the majority, who in turn interpreted 
them differently again from the concurring justices. lOB Thus, 
three different sets of judges emerged with three different 
readings of the facts. This suggests either that they dabbled in 
some fact-finding of their own or that there does not appear to 
be a consistent way of interpreting the facts of the Saucier case 
for the purposes of summary judgment. 
Chen asserts that precisely this kind of confusion fre-
quently reigns in qualified immunity determinations. 109 He 
notes that even the Anderson court acknowledged the "fact-
specific" nature of the qualified immunity inquiry.Ho Chen also 
quotes a district court opinion to the effect that "it often will be 
")6 See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-1 (2001). Yet, while immunity may 
disappear, strictly speaking, the defendant can invoke a defense of qualified immunity 
even at trial. The critical question, again, is whether the case should be allowed to 
proceed to trial and the costs and benefits involved in that decision. 
107 During a motion for summary judgment, the court views the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party and determines whether there are any 
genuine issues of material fact. Holley v. Crank, 386 F.3d 1248, 1255 (9th Cir. 2004); 
see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
108 Recall that the Ninth Circuit believed that Saucier's actions in subduing Katz 
were objectively unreasonable; reading the facts in a light favorable to Katz, Judge 
Thompson concluded that no reasonable officer could have behaved as Saucier did. In 
reversing the Ninth Circuit, the majority of the Supreme Court, however, pointed to 
"the uncontested fact that the force was not so excessive that respondent suffered hurt 
or injury." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 209. And the concurring justices cleared Saucier of 
wrongdoing only because "at no point did Katz say specifically, that Saucier himself ... 
pushed or shoved" him. [d. at 212. These vastly different readings of the facts are 
surprising, to say the least. 
109 Chen, supra note 13, at 37. 
110 [d. (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641). 
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impossible to assess the objective reasonableness of the defen-
dant's conduct without a resolution of the factual disputes sur-
rounding the incident from which the action arises."1ll He ar-
gues further that even the legal prong of the analysis - i.e., 
whether the relevant law was clearly established - depends on 
a determination of historical or "ultimate" fact - i.e., how 
clearly established the law actually was at the time of the inci-
dent. 112 
Yet, again, despite the "surface appeal" of this objection, it 
admits of a fairly straightforward resolution. David Ignall of-
fers a simple and compelling rejoinder to this objection."3 An 
excessive force defendant moving for summary judgment can 
prevail only if, on the basis of undisputed facts or disputed 
facts viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the 
judge concludes as a matter of law that no violation took 
place.114 The plaintiff bears the burden of alleging facts that, if 
supported, would substantiate his or her claim of a constitu-
tional violation; but if the plaintiff cannot proffer such facts, his 
or her case will fail. 115 
111 Chen, supra note 13, at 41 (quoting McGaughey v. City of Chicago, 664 F. 
Supp. 1131, 1138 (N.D. lll. 1987». 
lllI Chen, supra note 13, at 40. 
'13 David Ignall, Making Sense of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and 
Issues for the Trier of Fact, 30 Cal. W. L. Rev. 201, 203 (1994). 
'" Id. Ignall observes that "the defendant loses his shield of immunity not when 
the plaintiff can create a question about which reasonable minds could differ, but when 
the facts are sufficiently egregious so that reasonable minds, including the defendant's, 
could not differ as to the legality of the defendant's actions." Id. at 215. See generally 
Holley v. Crank, 386 F.3d 1248, 1255 (9th Cir. 2004). 
115 Ignall, supra note 113, at 215. Blum, supra note 25, at 208. Blum provides a 
helpful table of the different possibilities at summary judgment. She writes that: 
A district court's denial of a qualified immunity summary judgment motion must em-
brace the following conclusions of law: 
(1) The plaintiff has asserted a valid constitutional claim upon which relief may be 
granted; 
(2) The constitutional right defendant allegedly violated was clearly established at 
the time of the challenged conduct; 
(3) When the facts are undisputed, a reasonable officer, given the facts and cir-
cumstances confronting this officer at the time, would have understood her con-
duct to have violated plaintiffs clearly established right; 
(4) When the facts are in dispute: 
(a) looking at the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a reason-
able officer would have understood her conduct to have violated plaintiff's 
clearly established constitutional rights OR 
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The hypothetical situation depicted previously in this arti-
cle illustrates this point. 116 Most law enforcement agencies rec-
ognize some form of the rule that a peace officer may use 
deadly force to subdue a fleeing suspect only if that suspect 
poses a serious and imminent danger to the officer or to oth-
ers.1I7 Thus, in order to overcome a defendant officer's qualified 
immunity summary judgment motion, a plaintiff shot in the 
back by the officer would need to allege that he or she posed no 
imminent danger to anyone, and that the officer used deadly 
force. Whether the facts are undisputed or simply viewed in a 
light favorable to the plaintiff, the plaintiff would clear the 
first, factual prong of the immunity inquiry. The plaintiff would 
also pass the second element of the test, since the rule barring 
the unreasonable conduct was clearly established at the time of 
the incident. Chen's worries about factual determinations are 
therefore misplaced: as at any summary judgment hearing, no 
factual findings are made. Instead, the judge simply accepts 
undisputed facts and views the disputed ones in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party18 - in this case, the plaintiff. 
So too can the seemingly contradictory "interpretations" of 
the Saucier facts be resolved. The Ninth Circuit simply applied 
the qualified immunity test incorrectly, effectively collapsing 
the pretrial inquiry into a case on its merits.1I9 In so doing, the 
court easily made a fmding of objective unreasonableness. The 
Supreme Court majority, however, never actually reached a 
finding of fact, whether undisputed or otherwise, because it 
announced that Katz's claim failed the second, legal prong of 
clearly established law. 120 Finally, the concurrence, motivated 
by the logic of the Ninth Circuit, nevertheless concluded that 
the plaintiff's failure explicitly to state a claim that could war-
rant relief - in this case his neglecting to name the defendant 
(b) even accepting the defendant's version of the facts, a reasonable officer 
would have understood her conduct to have violated plaintiffs clearly estab-
lished constitutional rights. 
[d. at 225. 
116 See supra Parts I, II-A. 
117 See Interview with Jesse H. Grant, supra note 42. 
118 See Holley v. Crank, 386 F.3d 1248, 1255 (9th Cir. 2004). 
119 See Katz v. U.S., 194 F.2d 962, 968 (9th Cir. 2000). 
120 See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,209 (2001). 
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as the shover - doomed his case. 121 Indeed, the concurrence 
found facts different from those of the Ninth Circuit, yet this 
discrepancy between what should be consistent findings may 
simply reflect the perceptive eye of Justice Ginsburg. 
But what of Chen's contention that even the legal prong 
depends on factual findings? Indeed, strictly speaking, deter-
mining whether clearly established law in a given area existed 
at a particular time has factual elements to it. Yet, the clear 
establishment question fundamentally and overwhelmingly 
revolves around legal interpretation, albeit with residual ele-
ments of fact. As would any issue that can be resolved as a 
matter of law, a finding that a given law or rule was not clearly 
established should short-circuit a suit at the summary judg-
ment stage. 
In terms of the example above, whether a rule that prohib-
its using deadly force against a suspect in the absence of exi-
gent circumstances was clearly established admittedly involves 
asking questions that involve facts. Such questions might in-
clude: How widespread was this rule? Was the average police 
officer aware of it? What was its source? Was it statutory? 
Did it derive from case law? Still, these questions are stereo-
typically those that a judge would ask in an effort to under-
stand the state of the law, not the kinds of inquiries a jury 
would conduct. To be fair to Chen, however, the concept of 
clear establishment remains extremely murky, a problem that 
will be addressed later.122 Nevertheless, it dwells in the realm 
of the legal and therefore represents an appropriate target for 
early judicial disposition. 
Thus, the objection that granting qualified immunity in-
fringes an excessive force plaintiff's rights has been parried. 
But what if the current summary judgment arrangement 
threatens the rights of the accused officer? The existing formu-
lation leaves the qualified immunity doctrine seriously vulner-
able because a savvy plaintiff would surely allege facts that 
render the officer's conduct a constitutional violation, assuming 
the law was clearly established.123 In such a situation, the de-
121 See [d. at 212. 
122 See infra Part II-C. 
123 This last condition is not insignificant, but for the purposes of this section the 
clear establishment prong will be put on hold, assuming that it is met. Controlling the 
"clearly established" requirement will permit careful inspection of the role of facts and 
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fendant officer would rarely prevail at summary judgment. 
While some scholars might applaud such a result, it raises the 
question of what function the doctrine performs. 
It is useful to return to the example!24 of the plaintiff whom 
the defendant officer shot in the back. Assume that the rule 
prohibiting using deadly force against fleeing suspects except 
in cases of exigency was indeed clearly established at the time 
of the shooting and that the defendant should reasonably have 
known about it. At the qualified immunity hearing, the plain-
tiff will simply allege that he or she posed no danger to anyone 
else, and that the defendant used deadly force. The judge will 
credit the plaintiffs allegations for the purposes of summary 
judgment and decline to award the defendant summary judg-
ment based on qualified immunity. Plaintiffs in excessive force 
cases, therefore, have every incentive to claim particularly and 
perhaps exaggeratedly egregious behavior in order to clear 
summary judgment.!'s 
discovery. However, to the extent that the second prong involves some degree of reso-
lution of factual issues, such as whether a law was as a matter of fact clearly estab-
lished and whether the defendant should reasonably have applied it to his or her situa-
tion, those issues are considered here too; such factual elements of the legal issue may 
also require a mini-discovery to resolve fairly and fmally. For instance, in Prokey v. 
Watkins, 942 F.2d 67 (1st Cir. 1991) the First Circuit drew precisely such a distinction, 
finding that: 
Whether . . . a reasonable policeman, on the basis of the information known to 
him, could have believed there was probable cause is a question of law, subject to 
resolution by the judge not the jury .... [I]f what the policeman knew prior to the 
arrest is genuinely in dispute, and if a reasonable officer's perception of probable 
cause would differ depending on the correct version, that factual dispute must be 
resolved by a fact fmder. 
Id. at 73. In other words, there indeed exist factual elements of the legal prong of the 
qualified immunity analysis that may require resolution through full-fledged fact find-
ing. 
124 See supra Part I. 
125 The judge might reduce incentives for the plaintiff to exaggerate the alleged 
conduct either by imposing sanctions, later at trial, for statements later found to be 
wantonly hyperbolic, or, perhaps more practically, by requiring the plaintiff to meet a 
certain burden of production in order to proceed. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
already provide a method of punishing frivolous lawsuits and the threat of perjury 
prosecution would help to ensure truthful statements. See Fed. R. Civ. P. l1(b). In 
addition, the court could raise the evidentiary bar for proceeding to trial by, for in-
stance, compelling the plaintiff to establish a prima facie violation by clear and con-
vincing evidence. This would likely require a somewhat abrupt change in common law, 
a formal alteration of the federal rules, or congressional action, but could be of great 
use in winnowing meritless suits. For instance, in patent law an infringement defen-
dant seeking to invalidate a plaintiffs patent must do so by clear and convincing evi-
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2. Summary Judgment and Discovery in Qualified Immunity 
Cases Can Be Improved 
a. Bifurcating the Trial or Submitting Qualified Immunity 
Facts to a Jury 
Several scholars and judges have noticed this problem and 
have proposed various solutions. Ignall argues for doing away 
with pretrial qualified immunity hearings, sending the case 
directly to the jury instead, and bifurcating the jury's responsi-
bility into the immunity findings and the case on the merits. 126 
This would permit the jurors to make the relevant factual find-
ings while still terminating the litigation at an early stage, 
prior to considering its merits. 127 In a different approach, Blum 
suggests furnishing the jury at a unified trial- i.e., one consid-
ering the case's merits and any immunity defense - with inter-
rogatories aimed at a qualified immunity finding. 128 In her ap-
proach, the jury could receive special interrogatories on facts 
related to qualified immunity; based on the jury's findings, the 
judge could decide the ultimate legal question of whether the 
doctrine applies. 129 This division of labor would allow the jury 
to make the appropriate factual findings but would reserve the 
legal ruling for the judge.130 
Yet, while both of the above suggestions contain promise, 
they also suffer from important drawbacks. Ignall's proposed 
trial bifurcation would indeed engage the jury in a fact-finding 
exercise and would postpone the most intensive part of the trial 
- the case on the merits - until after a qualified immunity find-
ing. Unfortunately, this bifurcation proposal would still re-
quire selecting and dealing with a jury, in effect constituting a 
mini-trial. The involvement of a jury would appropriately re-
solve important issues and may deter a plaintiff from alleging 
exaggerated facts, but by tilting too far toward an actual trial, 
this approach would effectively deprive the defendant of pre-
trial immunity. Likewise, Blum's suggestion of jury interroga-
dence. See Bernhardt, L.L.C. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 386 F.3d 1371, 1378 
(Fed. Cir. 2004). 
126 Ignall, supra note 113, at 216-7. 
127 [d. 
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tories nicely reserves a factual role for a jury and a legal one for 
a judge but suffers from a similar deficiency: by waiting until 
trial to determine whether qualified immunity is appropriate, 
the interrogatory plan similarly squanders the savings that the 
doctrine would ordinarily provide. 
b. Restricting Discovery 
A more promising alternative involves engaging a judge-
led abbreviated discovery before a hearing upon a motion for 
qualified immunity summary judgment. If appropriately lim-
ited, such a mini-discovery would resolve tricky factual issues 
and forestall a plaintiffs hyperbolic factual charges. All the 
while, this mini-discovery would also maintain the doctrine's 
conservation of judicial resources and protection of law en-
forcement defendants. Such discovery could be restrained to 
questions pertaining only to the qualified immunity test and 
thereby avoid the problems associated with full-blown, open-
ended trial-caliber discovery. This idea appears to have first 
been broached by the Court in Anderson. There, Justice Scalia 
wrote in a footnote that: 
If the actions [the defendant] claims he took are different 
from those [the plaintiffs] allege (and are actions that a rea-
sonable officer could have believed lawful), then discovery 
may be necessary before [the defendant's] motion for sum-
mary judgment on qualified immunity can be resolved. Of 
course, any such discovery should be tailored specifically to 
the question of [the defendant's] qualified immunity!31 
Thus, the possibility of mini-discovery receives significant sup-
port, albeit in a footnote, from the Supreme Court. 132 Further-
131 Anderson, 483 U.S. at 646 n.6. 
132 Blum suggests a similar idea, noting that: 
In some cases, factual disputes can be resolved prior to trial simply by allowing 
limited discovery to proceed on the facts crucial to the qualified immunity defense. 
Rather than deny qualified immunity at this early stage (which inevitably leads to 
delay and more expense in the form of an interlocutory appeal), the district court 
should simply defer its decision on qualified immunity until the material facts are 
sufficiently developed or clarified so that a decision can be made at the summary 
judgment stage. 
Blum, supra note 25, at 207-8. 
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more, abbreviated discovery should provide an added benefit by 
saving time and money for both plaintiff and defendant. 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contain abundant au-
thority for limiting discovery when appropriate. In general, the 
catchall discovery rule outlines the normal course that discov-
ery takes "[u]nless otherwise limited by order of the court in 
accordance with these rule s. ",33 In addition, a district court 
may enter, upon the motion of any party, any protective order 
"which justice requires.",34 Even without the parties' presenta-
tion of any motions, the court is empowered to quash or modify 
third-party subpoenas as it sees fit under certain circum-
stances.'35 Finally, while in most federal litigation the parties 
are required to provide certain initial disclosures of documents, 
damages, and planned expert testimony, those burdens are 
lifted from certain actions and litigants. 136 In short, the Federal 
Rules generally contemplate the need to adjust the otherwise 
onerous obligations of discovery when appropriate. 
This tendency can be seen, in particular, in two instances. 
In patent litigation, a determination of whether a patent is in-
fringedl37 or invalidl38 depends heavily on the interpretation of 
the patents' claims, or the exact nature of the invention at is-
sue. In order to provide a jury of laypeople with a clear state-
ment of what the invention claims, most district judges hold a 
"Markman hearing," named after a landmark patent case es-
tablishing that judges determine the meaning of a patent's 
claims as a matter of law.139 Different courts hold Markman 
hearings, on the results of which the entire litigation may turn, 
at often vastly different stages of discovery, some on the very 
eve of trial.140 What this illustrates is that the courts have wide 
discretion to tailor critical portions of discovery to suit the 
needs of a particular area of practice. 
133 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b). 
134 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). 
135 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(B). 
136 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(E)(i-viii). 
137 35 U.S.C. § 271. 
138 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103. 
139 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
140 David C. Doyle & Richard C. Kim, Determining The Scope Of Patent Rights 
(Claim Construction) In Southern Cal., (Fed. Bar Assoc. Newsletter), San Diego Chap-
ter 2003, at 4. 
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Another example can be found in trade secret litigation. 
Under California law, when a party sues for trade secret mis-
appropriation, the plaintiff cannot commence discovery until he 
or she identifies with "reasonable particularity" the contents of 
the trade secret itself. l<1 The purposes of this provision include 
"assist[ing] the court in framing the appropriate scope of dis-
covery," permitting the defendant to formulate a well-reasoned 
defense, and generally preventing a trade secret plaintiff from 
embarking on a "fishing expedition" designed to harass a com-
petitor defendant. 142 The provision is binding on federal courts 
as well as California courts. 143 Thus, there exist mechanisms 
for federal courts to impose appropriate limits upon otherwise 
untamed discovery. Such limits could be applied to the area of 
qualified immunity determinations in excessive force cases as 
well. 
To be sure, the mini-discovery alternative in this context is 
not without its problems. First and foremost, both Bluml44 and 
Chenl45 question whether discovery can be limited in any mean-
ingful way. Chen observes that "the facts relevant to the im-
munity issue will be precisely the same facts necessary for the 
evaluation of liability" on the merits. 146 Because the "substan-
tive constitutional law inquiry and the qualified immunity in-
quiry are intertwined," contends Chen, there can be no princi-
pled distinction between full-fledged discovery and one limited 
to the immunity question.147 
It is possible, however, to outline limiting principles that 
could regulate an abbreviated discovery. First, the judge may 
restrict discovery on the legal prong of the analysis to the fac-
tual issues contained therein, for example, the sources of law 
that would establish whether the conduct in question was pro-
hibited by clearly established law.148 While, to be sure, a trial 
jury could also be charged with finding such facts, the judge 
141 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 2019.210 (West 2005). 
I" Computer Economics, Inc. v. Gartner Group, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 980, 985 
(S.D. Cal. 1999). 
143 [d. at 991; see also Vermont Microsystems, Inc. v. Autodesk, Inc., 88 F.3d 142, 
147 (2d Cir. 1996); Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co., Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 
1322, 1325-26 (S.D. Fla. 2001). 
144 Blum, supra note 25, at 208-9. 
145 Chen, supra note 13, at 74. 
1 .. ld. 
147 Id. 
148 See infra Part II-C. 
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could order limited discovery, with the judge as fact-finder, re-
volving around those circumstances. In this regard, documen-
tary discovery could be restricted to directives and regula-
tions"9 available to the officer from the police department at the 
time of the incident. The plaintiff could also be permitted to 
propound interrogatories150 upon the officer and to request ad-
missions151 related to whether the officer knew or should have 
known that his or her conduct was impermissible. The plaintiff 
could also seek discovery into the practices that the police de-
partment employs to share relevant legal information with its 
officers. Ultimately, either side could move for summary 
judgment or partial summary judgment, at which point the 
judge would decide whether the law proscribing the officer's 
behavior was clearly established at the time of the incident. 
Second, the judge could open discovery to the factual issues 
involved in whether the officer's conduct violated clearly estab-
lished law but limit the kinds of evidence that could be adduced 
to affidavits and eyewitness testimony, for instance. In a typi-
cal summary judgment motion, the parties introduce declara-
tions of undisputed matters. 152 In addition, the court must view 
disputed matters in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party.163 Thus, if the officer moves for summary judgment on 
qualified immunity grounds, the plaintiff can avoid summary 
judgment by introducing sworn declarations testifying to his or 
her version of the events - assuming, of course, that the plain-
tiff's version substantiates a violation of clearly established 
law. This arrangement would empower the plaintiff but also 
require him or her to submit statements sworn under penalty 
of perjury, unlike a complaint in which bare allegations can be 
presented. 
In addition, by excluding other forms of evidence - say, fo-
rensic or ballistic reports - the judge could conserve time and 
money by adjudicating only the reliability of various sworn 
statements. Hiring independent experts to pore over test re-
sults can occupy many months and can cost the parties tens of 
34. 
149 In federal court, parties obtain documentary discovery through Fed. R. Civ. P. 
150 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33. 
151 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36. 
152 See Orsini v. O/S Seabrooke O.N., 247 F.3d 953, 955 (9th Cir. 2001). 
153 Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 309 (1996). 
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thousands of dollars. While certain tests might ultimately be-
come necessary at trial, the judge could reasonably limit dis-
covery to weighing the sworn statements the parties submit.154 
Alternatively, the court, with the parties' consent, could choose 
its own ballistics or forensic expert to render an unbiased opin-
ion. Through abbreviated discovery, judges could weed out 
frivolous claims at an early stage of litigation, while still pro-
viding plaintiffs with a fair opportunity to move forward. Hav-
ing formulated an abbreviated version of discovery that re-
solves factual issues while conserving resources and protecting 
law enforcement defendants, this article moves on to explore 
what exactly defines a law as "clearly established." 
C. MORE CLEARLY DEFINING "CLEAR ESTABLlSHM:ENT" 
1. The Current State of the Law Leaves "Clear Establishment" 
Anything But 
Once the judge has resolved the factual issues involved in 
the first prong of the analysis, he or she must confront the re-
quirement that the relevant law be clearly established. This 
section will explain how specifically the "clearly established" 
law must be defined and what sources of law qualify. The 
touchstone of clear establishment involves enabling an officer 
to identify the "clear contours" of the law, a term that should 
include analogous case law and departmental directives. First, 
though, it is useful to examine how the courts have interpreted 
"clear establishment." 
Judge Thompson, in the Ninth Circuit Saucier opinion, of-
fered a fairly expansive view of clear establishment that ap-
peared limited only by the Fourth Amendment's injunction 
against "unreasonable search and seizure" and a vague balanc-
ing test. 155 As previously recounted, Justice Scalia in Anderson, 
echoed by Justice Kennedy in Saucier, stated,156 "the contours of 
the right must be sufficiently clear.",57 However, this confusion, 
combined with the ambiguity of the term "clear contours," 
I" The judge might also, more radically, admit direct and cross-examination only 
of the parties involved - the defendant officer and the excessive force plaintiff. This 
option might require an amendment to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
1M See Katz v. U.S., 194 F.3d 962, 968 (9th Cir. 1999). 
1M See supra Part IT-A. 
167 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). 
29
Rosen: Improving Qualified Immunity
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2005
168 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35 
hardly defines the limits of clear establishment if at all. Blum 
observes that, according to several circuit court decisions, 
"when the right in question is subject to a balancing test, the 
right will rarely be found clearly established.m68 Yet, says 
Blum, "even within the same circuit, there is not always 
agreement on whether the contours of the right have been 
clearly established. m69 Nevertheless, the meaning of "clear es-
tablishment" need not vary according to the details and context 
of every particular case. 
2. Outlining the Contours of Clear Establishment 
Instead, by piecing together portions of Supreme Court 
opinions, the ideas of various scholars, and public policy con-
siderations, it is possible to formulate a useful and uniform un-
derstanding of clearly established law. The definition of the 
elusive term should encompass statutes, judge-made law, 
analogous cases, and even relevant police department regula-
tions designed to interpret and give effect to recent court rul-
ings. These various sources of law provide a range of different 
areas with which society can expect its law enforcement agents 
to be familiar. Finally, as Barbara Armacost suggests, the 
clearly established law requirement should be relaxed to in-
clude an exception for truly egregious conduct. 
To begin with, directly applicable statutes appear to be 
squarely within the contemplation of the Court in its language 
of "clear contours." Analogous case law, and by extension 
clearly on-point case law, are explicitly mentioned in Saucier. 
There, Justice Kennedy stated that: 
Assuming, for instance, that various courts have agreed that 
certain conduct is a constitutional violation under facts not 
distinguishable in a fair way from the facts presented in the 
case at hand, the officer would not be entitled to qualified 
immunity based simply on the argument that courts had not 
agreed on one verbal formulation of the controlling stan-
dard.16o 
158 Blum, supra note 25, at 200 and accompanying cases in n.58. 
159 [d. at 202. 
160 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202-3. 
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The Court thus provides some guidance in defining clearly es-
tablished law by accepting the role of indistinguishable facts as 
a valid form of such law. lsl In this way, judicial determination 
of the legal prong at a qualified immunity hearing may revolve 
around competing briefs, alternately equating and distinguish-
ing the facts of a relevant case from those in the situation at 
hand. In another recent case, the Supreme Court stated that 
the purpose of the "clearly established" language is to provide 
law enforcement with "fair warning" that their conduct violates 
established law even in novel factual circumstances. 162 
The Fourth Amendment and excessive force contexts seem 
particularly well suited to analogous law determinations. As 
Ignall notes, criminal defendants have helped place Fourth 
Amendment issues among the most litigated in the country by 
challenging various rules and thereby helping to clarify the 
substantive law of criminal procedure. l63 Detective Grant avers 
that officers in the Oakland Police Department, as well as 
those in several others in Northern California, receive monthly 
bulletins from the county district attorney keeping them ap-
prised of recent developments in relevant case law.'64 These 
updates should serve the notice function that, according to Ar-
macost, ensures the fair treatment of defendant officers. 165 
But what about consistency among the circuits? Analogiz-
ing cases with similar facts should extend to litigation drawn 
from outside of the circuit in which the hearing is held. Just as 
in most cases, applicable or analogous rulings inside a given 
circuit are considered dispositive while those from outside the 
circuit are persuasive, so too should cases offering analogous 
rules, standards, or facts enjoy dispositive value, if inside the 
circuit, or persuasive value, if outside. Unfortunately, Blum 
finds that there exist wide discrepancies in how different cir-
cuits defer to the clear establishment jurisprudence of their 
161 See also Armacost, supra note 13, at 633. 
162 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 740 (2002). 
163 Ignall, supra note 113, at 218. 
164 Interview with Jesse H. Grant, supra note 42. 
160 Armacost quotes a First Circuit opinion asserting that "whether the right was 
reasonably well settled at the time of the challenged conduct and whether the manner 
in which the right related to the conduct was apparent .... [C]ourts may neither re-
quire that state actors faultlessly anticipate the future trajectory of the law nor permit 
claims of qualified immunity to turn on the eventual outcome of a hitherto problematic 
constitutional analysis." Martinez v. Colon, 54 F.3d 980, 988 (lst Cir. 1995), quoted in 
Armacost, supra note 13, at 620. 
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sister circuits, with the Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits be-
ing the least deferential. l66 It is therefore important to ensure 
that the different circuits give at least some effect to clear es-
tablishment rulings in all federal appellate courts; such a move 
might require amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure or the rules of precedent of the individual circuits. 
This may not ensure uniformity of "clearly established law" 
across all circuits but it will promote some amount of consis-
tency. 
As for excessive force balancing tests, it would be unrealis-
tic to expect officers in the heat of the moment to balance vari-
ous public policy arguments. Armacost quotes a Seventh Cir-
cuit case to this effect, arguing that: 
differences in the nature of the competing interests from case 
to case make it difficult for a governmental official to deter-
mine, in the absence of case law that is very closely analo-
gous, whether the balance he strikes is an appropriate ac-
commodation of the competing individual and governmental 
interests. '67 
Still, officers should be aware of the relevant case law involved 
in those balancing tests and capable of applying the same logic 
to the situation they face. Armacost sums this up nicely in her 
own words, stating that: 
qualified immunity protects from liability an official whose 
only error was in failing to predict how courts would evaluate 
the relevant competing interests. If, however, an official can 
be charged with ''knowledge of the law" via the surrogate of 
"previously-decided case(s) with clearly analogous facts," that 
official will be deemed blameworthy and qualified immunity 
will be denied. 168 
166 Blum, supra note 25, at 203-05. 
167 Gregorich v. Lund, 54 F.3d 410, 414 (7th Cir. 1994), quoted in Armacost, supra 
note 13, at 650. The Gregorich court also noted that "governmental officials are not 
expected to be prescient and are not liable for damages simply because they legiti-
mately but mistakenly believed that the balancing of interests tipped in the State's 
favor." Gregorich, 54 F.3d at 414-5. 
168 Armacost, supra note 13, at 650-51(quoting Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 
(lst Cir. 1987». 
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Eschewing balancing tests as grounds for clearly established 
law poses no serious problems so long as analogous factual 
situations can form the basis for a fmding of clearly established 
law. IB9 
In addition to analogous cases, clearly established law 
should also encompass the various rules and regulations for-
mulated by individual police departments or county prosecu-
tors. Detective Grant notes that Oakland police officers are 
responsible for learning and obeying departmental rules as 
well as for participating in ongoing and regular training semi-
nars. 170 Any such departmental rules that concern constitu-
tional conduce71 - whether they involve searches, arrest, or the 
use of force - should be considered clearly established law for 
qualified immunity purposes. After all, officers are on notice in 
theory and in practice of these regulations and it is perfectly 
fair to hold them responsible for following the rules. While 
such regulations may exceed the constitutional floor for deter-
mining Fourth Amendment violations, they offer instructive 
help in defining what constitutes a clearly established law. 
These considerations can profitably be applied to our hypo-
thetical case of the suspect shot in the back. In such a case, the 
plaintiff, in order to escape summary judgment on the legal 
prong, could pursue any number of avenues in order to show 
the clear establishment of the law barring the officer's conduct. 
The rule forbidding the use of deadly force against a fleeing 
suspect, absent exigency, could be formulated as a statute. 
Short of that, it could emerge as a standard from particular 
cases, whether inside or outside the circuit. It may also be 
nothing more than a vague statement in dictum, but cases with 
identical or similar fact patterns may apply to render it clearly 
established. Finally, individual police departments may issue 
regulations reciting a rule barring such conduct. In any such 
instance, the plaintiff ought to prevail at the qualified immu-
nity hearing. 
One exception should apply to this understanding of 
clearly established law as well as to the qualified immunity 
169 Armacost, supra note 13, at 650-51. 
170 Interview with Jesse H. Grant, supra note 42. 
171 Regulations regarding non-constitutional matters, such as attire or hygiene 
requirements, would, of course, not qualify as clearly established law or form the basis 
for a private cause of action. 
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calculus in general. Armacost argues that certain conduct, 
based on facts alleged by an excessive force plaintiff, can be so 
egregious as to obviate summary judgment entirely.l7ll Such 
conduct, resembling behavior that fails the "shocks-the-
conscience" test of due process, can be defined, according to 
Armacost, as "contain [ing] indicia of its own blameworthi-
ness. "173 In other words, the conduct, as alleged, is so plainly 
impermissible that clearly established law is unnecessary to 
establish a constitutional violation. Armacost cites, by way of 
example, a case in which an officer held a gun to a nine-year-
old child's head, threatening to pull the trigger, despite the ab-
sence of a threat to the safety of anyone.''' The court there re-
fused to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity, despite the 
absence of a precisely analogous case, since "[i]t would create 
perverse incentives indeed if a qualified immunity defense 
could succeed against those types of claims that have not previ-
ously arisen because the behavior alleged is so egregious that 
no like case is on the books.''''· In other words, it is important 
to place certain limits on conduct that is especially repulsive 
but that is described in no previous case, since failing to do so 
would simply invite that egregious behavior.17. Setting that ex-
ception aside, this subsection has developed and clarified the 
ill-defined idea of "clearly established law." By drawing on 
statutes, dispositive and analogous case law, and departmental 
rules and regulations, it is possible to formulate a more thor-
ough version of the requirements of the second, legal prong of 
the qualified immunity analysis. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The qualified immunity doctrine derives from society's 
need to balance the competing concerns of effective crime-
fighting and support for those who daily put their lives on the 
line for the community on the one hand, and ordinary citizens 
whose civil rights are grossly abused on the other. The Su-
172 See Armacost, supra note 13, at 661-63. 
173 [d. at 662. 
17. McDonald v. Haskins, 966 F.2d 292, 292-3 (7th Cir. 1992), cited in Armacost, 
supra note 13, at 662. 
175 McDonald, 966 F.2d at 295, quoted in Armacost, supra note 13, at 662. 
17. See also Ignall, supra note 113, at 218. 
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preme Court has formulated a standard of qualified immunity 
that hinges on two critical elements. To make out an action-
able claim and avoid dismissal at summary judgment, an ex-
cessive force plaintiff must demonstrate first that the conduct, 
as alleged by the plaintiff, amounted to a constitutional viola-
tion. Second, after this factual showing, the plaintiff must also 
convince a judge that the conduct in question was forbidden by 
clearly established law of which any reasonable officer would 
be aware. 
This doctrine has become especially important amidst a re-
trenchment in support for urban law enforcement. Unsustain-
able complaints against police behavior appear to be on the rise 
and, whether or not personal financial liability plays an impor-
tant role in the calculus, the conduct of police officers seems to 
be influenced by these trends. All of these developments neces-
sitate some system of terminating unjustified lawsuits at an 
early stage. 
Yet, this seemingly simple qualified immunity standard 
actually contains great complexity. Supreme Court justices 
and scholars have questioned whether, in the excessive force 
context, the qualified immunity doctrine double-counts reason-
ableness and offers the defendant "two bites at the apple." Ul-
timately, the "double-reasonableness" of the doctrine reflects 
happenstance and fundamental fairness more than a rational 
impossibility. Others have contended that the factual nature of 
excessive force cases renders them unfit for adjudication at the 
summary judgment stage. In most cases, though, the judge can 
simply assume the necessary facts in order to decide both the 
factual and legal prongs of the inquiry. Still, rather than abdi-
cating the immunity investigation to the jury, courts might 
usefully employ some limited system of judge-led discovery in 
order to resolve thorny disputes of fact, to conserve judicial re-
sources, and to deter false allegations. Finally, the definition of 
clear establishment is as murky as it is crucial. This article 
outlined a vision of what the term encompasses, ranging from 
statutes to analogous case law to departmental regulations. 
While certain problems continue to bedevil such an explication 
of clearly established law, it is possible to improve on the 
courts' attempts to foster clarification. 
By restricting, as the present qualified immunity doctrine 
does, liability in excessive force cases to constitutional viola-
tions of clearly established law, our legal system offers abused 
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plaintiffs and law enforcement the optimal balance of enabling 
effective crime-fighting and stigmatizing truly blameworthy 
conduct. 177 By providing for limited discovery and better defin-
ing the scope of clear establishment, our system can better 
equilibrate that balance and serve the interests of all. 
177 In closing, Armacost concludes her own thoughts with the following: "limiting, 
rather than expanding, the scope of liability for constitutional violations - by authoriz-
ing its use only against clearly and 'genuinely threatening' conduct - may be the best 
way to reinforce the special place of constitutional rights in our jurisprudence and ... 
in the public consciousness." Armacost, supra note 13, at 680. 
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